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COMMENTS
EQUITY-PARTIAL ENFORCEMENT OF RESTRICTIVE COVENANT IN
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT
Fullerton Lumber Co. v. Torborg, 70 N.W.2d 585 (Wis. 1955)
Defendant was employed as manager of plaintiff's lumber yard
pursuant to a contract containing a restrictive covenant prohibiting
defendant from engaging in the lumber business within a fifteen-mile
radius of plaintiff's yard for a period of ten years after termination of
employment. Subsequently, defendant voluntarily concluded his em-
ployment and opened a competing lumber yard in violation of the
covenant. As a result, plaintiff suffered substantial loss of business,
and sought to enforce the covenant by enjoining defendant's compet-
ing operations. The trial court, finding that the ten-year restriction
was unreasonable and unnecessary, refused to enforce the covenant.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed and remanded,
ordering the lower court to issue an injunction enforcing the covenant
for a period of time found reasonable and necessary.2
Historically, courts have viewed restrictive covenants with disfavor.
In particular, covenants between employer and employee have been
carefully examined, because the former has often used his superior
bargaining position to exact oppressive concessions as a condition of
employment.' Situations often arise, however, where an employee, by
virtue of the nature of his employment, has acquired confidential in-
formation or the "good will" of the public with whom he transacts
business. Under such circumstances the courts have validated re-
strictive covenants, provided the restrictions are found to be "reason-
able.' In determining reasonableness the courts have had three pri-
mary interests to reconcile: (1) that of the employer in protecting his
established business; (2) that of the employee in being able to freely
choose his occupation; and (3) that of the public in maintaining a pro-
ductive, competitive economy.5
The arbitrary rule that a restrictive covenant will be enforced only
if found to be reasonable as written has proved inadequate in situa-
1. Plaintiff's total sales declined approximately 70% after defendant com-
menced business operations. Fullerton Lumber Co. v. Torborg, 70 N.W.2d 585,
588 (Wiq. 1955).
2. Fullerton Lumber Co. v. Torborg, 70 N.W.2d 585 (Wis. 1955). The court
indicated that three years would be a "reasonable" time. Id. at 592.
3. Sternberg v. O'Brien, 48 N.J. Eq. 370, 22 Atl. 348 (Ch. 1891); Milwaukee
Linen Supply Co. v. Ring, 210 Wis. 467, 246 N.W. 567 (1933).
4. Poultry Producers of Southern California, Inc. v. Barlow, 189 Cal. 278, 208
Pac. 93 (19'22); Axelson v. Columbine Laundry Co., 81 Colo. 254, 254 Pac. 990
(1927); Grand Union Tea Co. v. Walker, 208 Ind. 245, 195 N.E. 277 (1935);
Eigelbach v. Boone Loan & Inv. Co.. 216 Ky. 69, 287 S.W. 225 (1926) ; Sherman v.
Pfefferkorn, 241 Mnss. 468, 135 N.E. 568 (1922); Eureka Laundry Co. v. Long,
146 Wis. 205, 131 N.W. 412 (1911).
5. See the discussion of this problem in John Roane, Inc. v. Tweed, 89 A.2d 548
(Del. 1952).
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tions in which some restrictions on the employee's future activity could
be justified, but not the particular limitations stipulated in the em-
ployment contract. Consequently, the English courts have developed
the "blue pencil" rule,6 which provides that a restrictive covenant, un-
reasonable as written, will be enforced if the objectionable features of
the agreement can be eliminated by striking out the offending word or
phrase.7 A majority of American courts have adopted a similar posi-
tion, and have enforced such restrictive covenants where the agree-
ment is considered "divisible" so that the objectionable portions can
be severed.8 The divisibility doctrine is also set forth in the Restate-'
ment of Contracts.9
Even though accepted by a majority of courts, the divisibility doc-
trine has been the subject of considerable recent criticism; indeed, it
has often been honored only by clever avoidance. 1° While the rule pro-
vides the courts with a relatively simple formula for validating an
otherwise unreasonable restrictive covenant, its application is mechan-
ical, and emphasizes only the form of the agreement rather than the
intent of the parties. Under a literal application of the divisibility
doctrine, the restrictive provision will fail entirely unless the terms of
the agreement are drafted so that any objectionable features can be
physically deleted.-
Dissatisfaction with the cumbersome limitations of the divisibility
doctrine has led to the formulation of the so-called "partial enforce-
ment" rule.12 Under this doctrine a restrictive covenant containing
provisions which are both unreasonable as written and "indivisible"
will not fail completely, but will be enforced to the extent found rea-
6. See Attwood v. Lamont, [1920] 3 K.B. 571, for a discussion of the rule.
7. Price v. Green, 16 M. & W. 346, 153 Eng. Rep. 1222 (1847).
8. See, e.g., Kessler v. Jefferson Storage Corp., 125 F.2d 108 (6th Cir. 1941);
Consolidated Syrup Corp. v. Kaiser, 22 N.Y.S.2d 307 (Sup. Ct. 1940); Smith's
Appeal, 113 Pa. 579, 6 Atl. 251 (1886); General Bronze Corp. v. Schmeling, 208
Wis. 565, 243 N.W. 469 (1932).
9. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 518 (1932), provides:
Where a promise in reasonable restraint of trade . . . has added to it a
promise in unreasonable restraint, the former promise is enforceable unless
the entire agreement is part of a plan to obtain a monopoly; but if full
performance of a promise indivisible in terms, would involve unreasonable
restraint, the promise is illegal and is not enforceable even for so much of
- the performance as would be a reasonable restraint.
10. For example, in Edwards v. Mullin, 220 Cal. 379, 30 P.2d 997 (1934), an
agreement not to compete in the "northern portion of the state of California" was
construed to be divisible and was enforced as to the City of San Francisco. See
also Fleckenstein Bros. Co. v. Fleckenstein, 76 N.J.L. 613, 71 Atl. 265 (Ct. Err.
& App. 1908).
11. See, e.g., Interstate Finance Corp. v. Wood, 69 F. Supp. 278 (E.D. Ill. 1946);
Belt v. Belt, 135 Conn. 195, 63 A.2d 161 (1948); Wisconsin Ice & Coal Co. v.
Lueth, 213 Wis. 42, 250 N.W. 819 (1933).
12. See Williston & Corbin, On the Doctrine of Belt v. Beit, 23 CONN. B.J. 40,
50 n.2 (1949).
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sonable and necessary as to time 3 and area.14 While subjected to
early criticism,15 the doctrine of partial enforcement is being accepted
by an increasing number of courts'6 and leading authorities in the field
of contracts.'
Concededly, the application of the partial enforcement rule will in-
evitably result in the enforcement of a contract different from that for
which the parties bargained."' Where the only alternative is to refuse
enforcement entirely, however, this objection loses much of its force.
Clearly, partial enforcement more nearly effectuates the intent of the
contracting parties than does invalidating the covenant in its en-
tirety.' To permit partial enforcement of restrictive covenants within
the limits of the established public policy prohibiting contracts in re-
straint of trade does not appear to be an undue extension of equitable
principles. While not yet accepted by the majority of courts, the clear
trend of the better-reasoned recent cases is toward application of this
rule, and the decision of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in the prin-
cipal case is a sound one.
EVIDENCE-PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE EXCLUDES
TESTIMONY REGARDING ACCUSED'S SANITY BY
PSYCHIATRIST OF PUBLIC MENTAL HOSPITAL
Taylor v. United States, 222 F.2d 398 (D.C. Cir. 1955)
Defendant was indicted for grand larceny, robbery, and house-
breaking. Prior to trial, a court-appointed psychiatrist,' after ex-
amining defendant on several occasions, concluded that he was af-
flicted with severe schizophrenia2 and was mentally incompetent to
13. Whiting Milk Co. v. O'Connell, 277 Mass. 570, 179 N.E. 169 (1931);
Brannen v. Bouley, 272 Mass. 67, 172 N.E. 104 (1930); Edgecomb v. Edmonston,
257 Mass. 12, 153 N.E. 99 (1926).
14. Metropolitan Ice Co. v. Ducas, 291 Mass. 403, 196 N.E. 856 (1935).
15. Compare 15 B.U.L. REv. 834 (1935), with 32 B.U.L. REV. 224 (1952).
16. John Roane, Inc. v. Tweed, 89 A.2d 548 (Del. 1952); Ceresia v. Mitchell,
242 S.W.2d 359 (Ky. 1951) ; American Weekly, Inc. v. Patterson, 179 Md. 109, 16
A.2d 912 (1940).
17. 6 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1390 (1951); 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1660 (rev.
ed. 1937); Williston & Corbin, On the Doctrine of Beit v. Beit, 23 CONN. B.J. 40
(1949).
18. This was the argument of the dissenting judge in the principal case. Fuller-
ton Lumber Co. v. Torborg, 70 N.W.2d 585, 594 (Wis. 1955).
19. It should be noted that if there is any evidence of a deliberate plan to
coerce the acceptance of oppressive conditions, the restrictive covenant will be
held invalid under either the "divisibility" or "partial enforcement" test. Fuller-
ton Lumber Co. v. Torborg, 70 N.W.2d 585, 592 (Wis. 1955); 5 WILLISTON, CON-
TRACTS § 1660 (rev. ed. 1937).
1. The psychiatrist was appointed under 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1952), which au-
thorizes the court, on its own motion, to appoint a psychiatrist to examine an
accused if there is "reasonable cause to believe" he is mentally incompetent for
trial.
2. Schizophrenia is one of the most common of mental illnesses. The schizo-
phrenic, commonly considered to have a "split personality," is generally afflicted
with delusions and hallucinations which may result in criminal or anti-social
behavior. GUTTMACHER & WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAw 72-85 (1952).
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